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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a person walking into a lawyer’s office, asking whether he
or she can own an asteroid.  Space Mining Corporation (“SMC”) is a
United States based corporation selling the rights to this asteroid in
order to fund research and future missions to mine asteroids.  Once
the technology matures, the missions will be launched, and the inves-
tor who owns the asteroid will receive a percentage of all resources
collected.  Scientists have scouted this asteroid, and believe it to be
full of platinum, gold, and many other valuable resources.  The client
is concerned that if he or she purchases this asteroid without clear
property rights supported by law, the investment will be lost.  One
practiced in space law may immediately be reminded of lunar deeds,
pieces of the moon sold without anything to support those claims, but
the question the client has asked is still there, “Can I own an
asteroid?”
Most of what is commonly thought of as space law began under the
Outer Space Treaty and its progeny, which came into force in the late
1960s.  This law has not changed since the 1980s, when the last treaty
was passed.  One of the complications to this Treaty is that it was
based on a time when only national governments had the resources
and ability to launch a mission to space.  The technology and motiva-
† Author Bio: J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, Spring
2015; B.B.A., Texas A&M University 2007; Editor-in-Chief, Texas A&M Journal of
Real Property Law, 2014–2015.
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tion for private citizens to be involved in space is becoming a reality.
Scholars are calling for the formation of an international governing
entity to regulate and enforce these treaties.1  The technology to ex-
tract resources from celestial bodies, and more specifically asteroids, is
in its infancy.  Applying unnecessary constraints influenced by short-
term political currents may stifle innovation and create even more fi-
nancial disincentives to expand the reaches and resources available.
This Note will discuss why maintaining the status quo, while waiting
for the technology to mature, will encourage development and
strengthen the industry before being smothered by laws and regula-
tions promulgated by parties who may have conflicts of interest.  This
Note will first explain why scientists are attempting to mine asteroids.
It will then examine the rules that apply, including the two main space
treaties (the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty), the modern
view of the court, and the history of deep-sea mining.  Finally, this
Note will apply the treaties to modern plans being developed to har-
vest an asteroid.
II. WHY MINE?
The finite resources on Earth and the belief that asteroids have an
abundance of such resources, have lead scientists to hypothesize that
many useful minerals such as platinum can be found in abundance in
asteroids.2  The collection of those resources from an asteroid adds to
the total amount of resources available for use.  Some asteroids are
believed to be so rich that one asteroid could have more platinum
than the total amount harvested on Earth.3
An asteroid is a rock body that is orbiting the sun.4  Asteroids con-
tain different materials and metals such as nickel and iron.5  It is hy-
pothesized that some asteroids have high volumes of valuable and
rare metals such as platinum and gold.6  Meteors are asteroids that
1. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards A New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Min-
eral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794 (2010); see also Sarah Coffey, Establishing A
Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119 (2009).
2. David Cohen, Earth’s Natural Wealth: An Audit, NEW SCIENTIST, May 23,
2007, at 34–41, available at http://www.sciencearchive.org.au/nova/newscientist/027ns_
005.htm.
3. William BC Crandall, To: The Augustine Committee, Enabling Profitable As-
teroid Mining, ABUNDANT PLANET (Aug. 3, 2009), at 9, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
383154main_53%20-%2020090803.7.toAugustineCommittee-2009-08-03.pdf; see also
Donna Blankinship & Seth Borenstien, There’s Gold In Them Thar Asteroids, The-
Times-Tribune.com (Apr. 25, 2012), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/health-science/
there-s-gold-in-them-thar-asteroids-1.1304953.
4. NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Frequently Asked Questions, http://neo.jpl.
nasa.gov/faq (last visited July 31, 2014).
5. Id.
6. Kevin Bonsor, How Asteroid Mining Will Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, Nov.
10, 2000, available at http://science.howstuffworks.com/asteroid-mining.htm; see also
Donna Blankinship and Seth Borenstien, There’s Gold In Them Thar Asteroids, The-
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have come into the Earth’s atmosphere, unlike comets which are bod-
ies that are mainly composed of ice instead of rock.7  Most asteroids
orbit the sun in the asteroid belt, which is between Mars and Jupiter,
but some orbit closer to Earth.8
The primary goal of the exploratory missions to asteroids will be to
locate water, with the additional possibility to extract and return valu-
able metals, like platinum.9  Developing an efficient extraction tech-
nique will clear one of the major hurdles to long-term spacefaring and
colonization, and a new industry can be created.10  The mining of
these mineral-rich asteroids would yield metals for construction of col-
onies or resource collection facilities, water for rocket fuel and sus-
taining life, and a payoff of precious metals to investors.11
III. THE TREATIES, THE CASES, AND THE SEA
The laws that apply to space exploration have been created through
treaties under the United Nations (“UN”).  In 1958, the UN created
the Office for Outer Space Affairs (“UNOOSA”) as the body to im-
plement the decisions of both the General Assembly and the smaller
committee, the Outer Space Affairs Division.12  There are five main
treaties that govern interactions in space.13  As of the writing of this
Note, three countries have completed manned space missions: the
United States, Russia, and China.14  Nine other countries (and space
agencies) have launched satellites: France, Japan, Great Britain, the
European Space Agency, India, Israel, Iran, North Korea, and South
Korea.15  The two main treaties examined within this Note are the
Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty.
Times-Tribune.com (Apr. 25, 2012), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/health-science/
there-s-gold-in-them-thar-asteroids-1.1304953.
7. NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Frequently Asked Questions, http://neo.jpl.
nasa.ogv/faq (last visited July 31, 2014).
8. Id.
9. Susan Thomas, Gold rush in space?  Asteroid miners prepare, but eye water




12. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.
org/oosa/en/OOSA/index.html (last visited July 31, 2014).
13. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, United Nations Trea-
ties and Principles on Space Law, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/OOSA/index.html
(last visited July 31, 2014).
14. Manned Flight, ENCYCLOPEDIA ASTRONAUTICA, http://www.astronautix.com/
flights/index.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2014); see also, Spacefaring, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacefaring (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
15. Q ‘n A: Answers To Your Questions, Spacetoday.org (last visited Feb. 17,
2014), http://www.spacetoday.org/Questions/FirstSats.html; see also Spacefaring,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacefaring (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
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A. The Outer Space Treaty
The official name of the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”) is the Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.16  The Treaty was designed to have similar principles as the
Antarctic Treaty, which was a successful nonarmament treaty.17  In
1960, President Dwight Eisenhower addressed the UN General As-
sembly and pushed for a nonarmament treaty in space modeled on the
Antarctic Treaty’s principles.18  In 1963, the General Assembly of the
UN unanimously adopted a resolution calling for all states to refrain
from launching weapons of mass destruction into orbit based on state-
ments from the Soviet Union and the United States.19  This resolution
to refrain from launching weapons of mass destruction into space led
to the first draft of the OST, submitted in 1966.20  The final treaty was
signed into effect in 1967 and ratified by the United States that same
year.21  More than 100 nations are parties to this Treaty, including
every major spacefaring nation.22  The OST was drafted with an inter-
est in the nonarmament of space and an interest in peaceful explora-
tion of space.23  The OST does not contain provisions about resource
collection, as it was not the focus, but it does prohibit national appro-
priation of heavenly bodies.24
Article II of the OST states “Outer Space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”25  A government is not permitted to claim ownership of a
celestial body such as an asteroid.  This is why, for example, the
United States cannot claim ownership of the moon even though it was
the first sovereign nation to plant a flag there.  The Treaty uses the
16. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] available at http://
www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf, v-vi.
17. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-





22. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm (last visited July 31, 2014); see also
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space
(last visited July 31, 2014).
23. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 3.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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term celestial bodies throughout, which suggests that those bodies ref-
erenced are not just large celestial bodies, such as the moon, but also
smaller ones, such as asteroids.26
Article II has left what some analysts call a loophole, prohibiting
national governments from staking claim but arguably allowing non-
government entities to claim ownership in celestial bodies.27  If a pri-
vate entity such as SMC were to lay claim to an asteroid or other
celestial body, that corporation might not be subject to the same regu-
lations as its home government of the United States.  Article VI of the
OST tries to resolve this.28  It states that any “activities of non-govern-
mental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”29  This is clarified in Article
VII, which states the jurisdiction that launches the spacecraft is re-
sponsible for the actions of that craft.30
This Treaty is written with an eye to the future by referring disputes
that arise to be resolved through international law.31  The Treaty
neither expressly disallows the extraction of minerals nor does it disal-
low the use of asteroids and other celestial bodies.32  The closest pro-
hibition to the use of the materials in an asteroid is in Article IX,
which requires that any potentially harmful interference between par-
ties is to be resolved by international consultation before proceed-
ing.33  This means that if two nations were heading to the same
location to acquire the same resources, they are to resolve the dispute
through international consultation prior to launch.  The Treaty prohib-
its the armament of space and the governmental acquisition of celes-
tial bodies, but it encourages the cooperation amongst the member
states.34  Further, OST can be amended by a majority of the parties to
the agreement, allowing for a more specific resolution to disputes that
arise.35  At first glance, the answer to the hypothetical question is no.
The OST laid the ground for four other space treaties, commonly
viewed as the OST’s progeny.  The treaties that followed were: the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts,
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (commonly
called “The Rescue Agreement”); the Convention on International
26. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16.
27. Andres Jauregui, Legal Loophole May Pave Way For Private Ownership Of
Outer Space, THEHUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 6, 2012, 5:28 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/04/06/legal-loophole-may-pave-way-for-private-ownership-of-
outer-space_n_1409035.html.ownership-of-outer-space_n_1409035.html.
28. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 28.
32. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16.
33. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 6.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
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Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (commonly called
“The Liability Convention”); the Convention on Registration of Ob-
jects Launched into Outer Space (commonly called “The Registration
Convention”); and the Agreement governing the Activities of the
States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (commonly called
“The Moon Treaty”).36  These treaties have varying amounts of ac-
ceptance, but none come close to the limited acceptance of The Moon
Treaty.37
B. The Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty has not been as successful gaining ratification as
the OST, or even the rest of the treaties considered to be the progeny
of the OST.38  The Moon Treaty was first signed in December of 1979,
but it only has ten parties and five signatories (countries that signed
the Treaty who later decided not to ratify it).39  None of the parties
were a major spacefaring country.40  France and India are the two sig-
natories that are at least spacefaring.41  The goal of the Moon Treaty
was to solidify cracks in the OST, prohibiting military installations on
the moon, and prohibiting any weapons testing.42  It expressly prohib-
its any claim above or below the surface of the Moon by a sovereign
36. Id. at v–viii; see also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space, http://www.
unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (last visited July 23, 2014).
37. COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, Status of International
Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2014, Apr. 4, 2014, http:/
/www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2014_CRP07E.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2014); see also, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, Status of Inter-
national Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/
en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (last visited July 23. 2014).  The total nations
who have ratified each treaty are as follows: OST 103; Rescue 94; Liability 91; Regis-
tration 60; Moon 15.
38. Id.
39. The Parties are: Australia, Austria, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, and Uruguay. The Signatories are: France, Guate-
mala, India, Peru, and Romania. NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Agreement Gov-
erning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon
Agreement), http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/agreement-governing-activities-
states-moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-moon-agreement/ (last visited July 31, 2014).
40. NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), http://www.nti.org/trea-
ties-and-regimes/agreement-governing-activities-states-moon-and-other-celestial-bod-
ies-moon-agreement/ (last visited July 31, 2014); see also, Manned Flight,
ENCYCLOPEDIA ASTRONAUTICA, http://www.astronautix.com/flights/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2014); see also, Spacefaring, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Spacefaring (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
41. NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), http://www.nti.org/trea-
ties-and-regimes/agreement-governing-activities-states-moon-and-other-celestial-bod-
ies-moon-agreement/ (last visited July 31, 2014).
42. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty], http://www.unoosa.
org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf.
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nation.43  The Moon Treaty requires all parties to inform the UN of
activities conducted in space, and further include the results of those
activities, generally within a month of completion of the activity or
experiment.44  Article 1 of the Treaty expands the definition of the
Moon to include any celestial body.45  It also expressly closes any pos-
sibility of a loophole in the OST regarding non-government entities in
Article 11, Section 3, stating “natural resources in place, shall [not]
become property of any. . . international intergovernmental or non-
governmental organization, . . . or non-governmental entity or of any
natural person.”46
The widespread rejection of the Moon Treaty can be linked to the
fact that the Treaty calls for the creation of an enforcement body to
control and enforce space law.47  Article 11 calls for the creation of
this international regime.48  It requires this regime to share all re-
sources, including the granting of mining rights and the resources col-
lected, equitably by weighing both the needs of developing countries
and the efforts of the countries that have contributed to the explora-
tion of the Moon.49  Article 9 requires the UN to have an up-to-date
list of all constructed bases, the purpose of the base, and the status of
the base.50 Article 14 requires the parent jurisdiction of a non-govern-
mental entity to ensure compliance with the Treaty.51  Article 16 per-
mits an international intergovernmental organization, such as the
European Space Agency, to ratify the agreement and become a
party.52  The Treaty’s provisions prohibit any government or intergov-
ernmental organization, including corporations, to act outside of the
enforcement powers of this regime that would be created.  One prob-
lem with this prohibition is that all activities, experiments, technology,
resources, and bases would be monitored and distributed as this inter-
national regime deemed fit.
The Moon Treaty also addresses resource extraction on the moon.53
Because of Article 1, the definition of the moon is expanded to any
celestial body, so the Treaty encompasses all celestial bodies.54  The
Moon Treaty’s regime is given the power under Article 6 to permit the
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Articles in the Moon Treaty are numbered in Arabic numerals, not Roman
numerals. Moon Treaty, supra note 42, at 27.
46. Moon Treaty, supra note 42, at 31.
47. Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: failed international law or waiting in the
shadows?, THE SPACE REVIEW (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.thespacereview.com/arti-
cle/1954/1.
48. Moon Treaty, supra note 42, at 32.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 30–31.
51. Id. at 33.
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id. at 27–35.
54. Id. at 27.
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extraction of resources, but a portion must be given to other parties.55
This includes materials extracted for the support of the mission (such
as water to be used for fuel).56  However, Article 11 expressly prohib-
its any governmental or non-governmental entity from creating a right
of ownership in any materials on or extracted from the moon (and
from Article 1, any celestial body).57  This prohibits the ownership of
any interest in an asteroid, including the resources extracted.  The
Moon Treaty essentially hinders any for-profit venture from even be-
ginning to stake a claim in the resources to be extracted under Article
11.58  Under the Moon Treaty, the answer to the hypothetical is a clear
and unambiguous no.  A person cannot own any right to an asteroid
claimed by SMC.  This becomes more complicated because the Moon
Treaty has such a low number of nations that have ratified it.59
It is important to note that the Moon Treaty is still international
law, even though there are ten parties (fifteen signatories and ten par-
ties).  Many countries have not ratified the Treaty, but ratification
could be persuasive to a judge resolving a dispute.  The Moon Treaty
could also be used to exert political pressure on non-members.  This
occurred in the Law of the Sea Treaty when one powerful member
signed on.  As discussed later in this Note, the United States is not a
party to the Law of the Sea Treaty, but political pressure has been
applied to American companies mining the oceans.  The Moon Treaty
has little weight in the international community right now because of
its low participation, but if a major spacefaring nation did decide to
ratify it, the Treaty would become much stronger and would begin to
have weight.
In contrast to the Moon Treaty, the OST was successful in obtaining
widespread acceptance.  This is because the OST resolves conflicts
under current international law and does not set up an international
court, international arbitration, or international committee to regu-
late.  The OST was written so that many future technologies or ideas
would still fall under its regulations without requiring new treaties or
enforcement bodies.  The OST does not provide for the extraction of
resources, but it does not prohibit it either.  The Moon Treaty was
drafted more than ten years after the OST and attempts to create
more regulations and an enforcement body to resolve these issues, but
the enforcement body has been a large reason why the Moon Treaty
has almost universally been rejected.  This body could effectively pro-
hibit the exploitation of resources in space.  If the governing body is
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 31.
58. Moon Treaty, supra note 42, at 31.
59. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, Status of International
Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/
SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (last visited July 23, 2014).
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ever formed, it could give authority to parties that do not have the
ability to launch a satellite into stable orbit, allowing those countries
to restrict or impede the exploration of space and the development of
new technologies.
The spacefaring countries have wisely decided not to sign on to the
Moon Treaty.  Keeping the OST and its provision of using current in-
ternational law to resolve conflicts will allow the technology to mature
and wisdom to be used when regulations are required.  The OST was
written well after the Soviet Union had launched Sputnik and test-
fired an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.60  The result of waiting
was universal acceptance of the peaceful exploration of space, based
on the wisdom gained during the Cold War and the technologies de-
veloped.  While not being aggressively proactive may seem like a Wild
West approach, the law can resolve most conflicts that would arise.  It
would be premature to deliver sectors of space to a governing body
that could stifle space exploration through heavy-handed regulations,
and redistribution of technologies and harvested minerals.
C. Claiming Rights in Other Ways
Property rights can be claimed in many ways under national and
international law.  The OST calls for disputes to be resolved under
current international law.  In order to understand how this may be
applied, this Section will first look at how the courts of the United
States have decided issues related to ownership of space material.
This Section will also examine the Law of the Sea Treaty including
why some scholars believe this Treaty is what stifled innovation in
deep-sea mining.  Finally, this Section will examine the liability of cor-
porate, non-government entities being held to treaties.
1. Nemitz v. US
The court examined the ownership of an asteroid in Nemitz v. US.61
This short case involves a claim over “Eros,” which is a large asteroid
in orbit near Earth.62  NASA landed on Eros in 2001, and Gregory
Nemitz, a private citizen, attempted to assert property rights in Eros
by suing NASA for trespass.63  Nemitz’s claim stated the property
rights were granted because Nemitz had registered a claim on Eros
60. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
61. Nemitz v. United States, CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042 (D.
Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir.
2005).
62. Nemitz v. United States, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1.
63. Keay Davidson, Final Frontier for Lawyers—property rights in space/Land
claims, commercial schemes and dreams have legal eagles hovering, SFGATE.COM
(Oct. 16, 2005, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Final-frontier-for-law-
yers-property-rights-in-2564610.php.
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with the Archimedes Institute.64  The Archimedes Institute was a non-
governmental organization run by a group of private citizens that ran
a website which allowed anyone to claim a celestial body for free.65
Nemitz claimed property rights based on his registration with the Ar-
chimedes Institute website, but had not asserted any control over Eros
beyond his free application with a now-defunct, non-government web-
site.66  One of Nemitz’s claims was that he used the Archimedes Insti-
tute because of the loophole created in Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty.67  The court dismissed this case for failure to state a claim,
finding that Nemitz failed to assert a property right.68  The court also
determined that the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and the
rejection of the Moon Treaty were not enough for Nemitz to claim a
private property right.69  This dismissal was affirmed by the ninth cir-
cuit court.70
The creation of property rights under common law is generally ce-
mented in one of three avenues: discovery, creation, and capture.71
Here, Eros had been discovered by German Astronomer Gustav
Witt.72  Nemitz could not claim discovery, so he tried to claim the cre-
ation by registration with the Archimedes Institute, however Nemitz
did not create Eros.73  The law typically used for mineral and resource
rights is based on capture.74  A law-school staple, Pierson v. Post, illus-
trates how capture works.75  Pierson and Post were both hunters chas-
ing the same fox.76  While Post and his dogs were pursuing the fox,
Pierson shot the fox and took it.77  The court held that property rights
are created once the resource has been occupied, or in this instance,
captured by being mortally wounded.78  The case would be analogous
to the capture of an asteroid.  Here, Nemitz did nothing to bring Eros
64. Nemitz v. United States, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1.
65. The Archimedes institute was space-related website that offered to register
private property rights for free, and was hosted on permanent.com during the lawsuit.
http://www.permanent.com/archimedes-institute.html.
66. Nemitz v. United States, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Nemitz v. United States, 2004 WL 3167042, at *2.
70. Nemitz v. NASA 126 Fed. Appx. 343 at *1 (9th Cir. 2005) (Mem. op.).
71. Peter T. Wendel, Casebook Review: The Perfect Blend of Methodology, Doc-
trine & Theory: Property, 22 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 1031, 1036 (1999) (reviewing JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 4TH EDITION (1998)).
72. Edward F. Tedesco, Eros, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/191801/Eros (last updated Jan. 13, 2014).
73. Nemitz v United States, CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *1
(D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126 F. Appx. 343 (9th Cir.
2005).
74. 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gas and Oil § 8 (2012).
75. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 1805 WL 781, 1805 N.Y. Lexis 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805).
76. Pierson, 1805 WL 781, at 177.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 177–78.
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under his control.  Nemitz would have a much stronger argument if he
had landed a spacecraft on the asteroid and modified the asteroid’s
orbit.
Nemitz was acting like a patent troll.  A patent troll will register and
purchase patents without any interest in using the patent beyond ex-
cluding others.  Here, just like a patent troll, Nemitz registered prop-
erty rights in space without any ability or intent to act on those rights
except to exclude others.  Nemitz failed here because he did not estab-
lish any real property rights.  Nemitz established no control over what
he claimed was his and had no way to act on any of the property rights
he claimed.
The reason Nemitz’s case is important is that the federal court has
not closed the door to the creation of property rights in celestial bod-
ies.  The United States’ view on granting property rights to extrater-
restrial objects can be expanded by examining the eleventh circuit
court case of United States v. Roberts, where the court recognized
property rights in objects returned from space.79  The Apollo missions
brought back lunar samples that were held by NASA.80  A NASA in-
tern, Thad Roberts, was convicted for the theft of those rocks, as well
as several other samples gathered from space.81  By capturing the lu-
nar rocks, the court recognized that NASA created a property right in
the rocks when the court convicted Roberts.  This means that the
courts have recognized, contrary to the treaties in place, that NASA
occupied the rocks, creating a right by capture, and that the United
States government will support those property rights created.82
The American courts, through cases like Nemitz and Roberts, have
not expressly found that property rights can be created in space, but
they have hinted that there are property rights to be acquired in
materials harvested from space.  One can only speculate how those
rights would be created, but it is likely that the property would need
to be captured in order to create those rights.  Loose asteroids orbit-
ing in the asteroid belt cannot just be claimed.
2. Deep-Sea Minerals
The OST resolves conflicts with international law, and there are two
major examples of how this conflict has been resolved.  One drastic
example of international law is the treaties governing Antarctica.
Many governments were attempting to mine the continent while ex-
pressing superior rights to do so.83  The nations were unable to resolve
79. United States v. Roberts, 155 Fed. Appx. 501, 502 (11th Cir. 2005).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Listner, supra note 47, comments.
83. Mining in Antarctica, BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY, http://www.antarctica.
ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/environmental_issues/mining.php (last visited July
31, 2014).
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this conflict without establishing an entity to control the claiming of
mining sites.84  The eventual result of this was a moratorium set on
any commercial mining in Antarctica until 2040, but scientific
processes are still conducted without interference.85  The Law of the
Sea Treaty takes the opposite approach.  The Law of the Sea Treaty
governs the extraction of deep-sea minerals from international waters,
which sets up a regulatory body similar to what may happen if the
Moon Treaty is signed.
a. Law of the Sea Treaty
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is commonly
referred to as the Law of the Sea Treaty (“LOST”).  It is hypothesized
that if the enforcement body from the Moon Treaty were to be
formed, it would mirror LOST Part XI, which formed “The Enter-
prise.”86  “The Enterprise” is the commercial arm of the International
Seabed Authority (“ISA”).87  “The Enterprise” was established to col-
lect technologies used to mine deep-sea resources, and in turn give
those technologies to non-developed countries.88  This act is one of
the reasons listed by President Ronald Reagan for not signing
LOST.89  The ISA has the authority to set prices for the sale of miner-
als, as well as setting the tax rate on the resources collected.90  This
money is then used to fund the ISA, “The Enterprise,” and can be
redistributed to non-developed countries.91  In contrast, the United
States follows its own statutory language, the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
eral Resources Act, which is similar to LOST with the exception of
Part XI.92
LOST was not recognized by the United States until President Bill
Clinton signed it in 1994.93  However, the Treaty is not binding on the
United States because the Senate has still not ratified LOST, with the
most recent failure to ratify occurring in 2012.94  Analysts and schol-




87. Frequently Asked Questions, International Seabed Authority, http://www.isa.
org.jm/en/about/faqs (last visited July 31, 2014).
88. Listner, supra note 47.
89. Ian Bezpalko, Note, The Deep Seabed: Customary Law Codified, 44 Nat. Re-
sources J. 867, 872–74 (2004).
90. Rejecting the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST), National Space Society, 2 (Mar.
13, 2009), http://www.nss.org/legislative/NSS-LoST-WhitePaper.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473 (2002).
93. Bezpalko, supra note 89, at 873–74.
94. Id. at 874; see also Tom Murse, Law of the Sea Treaty Timeline Important
Dates in the Debate, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/Obama-Administration/a/Law-Of-
The-Sea-Treaty-Timeline.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
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effect of the Treaty.95  The ISA is only now seeing a surge of interest
from mining companies.96
The international governing body created in LOST Part XI is com-
monly seen as the major point of contention between those for the
ratification and those against its ratification.97  The Moon Treaty, in
Article 11, prohibits a nation, non-governmental entity, or natural
person, from staking a claim or establishing property rights.  Part XI
of LOST has similar language, stating in Article 137, “No State or
natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with
respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance
with this Part.”98  This Article also states that the resources belong to
“mankind as a whole” and denies the recognition of property rights in
any minerals claimed or harvested in conflict with the Treaty.99  The
ISA is granted complete immunity from legal process and any form of
search or seizure.100  This immunity grants the ISA the same rights as
a national sovereignty.101  The ISA’s home territory would be interna-
tional waters within the UN’s jurisdiction.102
Subsection E of Part XI establishes the Enterprise as an arm of the
ISA.103  Article 144 requires all parties to cooperate in the transfer of
technology and scientific knowledge, including “facilitating access of
the Enterprise and of developing states to the relevant technology,
under fair and reasonable terms and conditions.”104  The transfer of
ownership and control of technologies used is mandated, so the Enter-
prise has a major interest in obtaining the technology which could be
used as leverage when bargaining for a mineral lease.105  In Article
268, member states are required to acquire and disseminate marine
technology.106  If one party has developed a usable process, the host
country of that party is required to give the technology to the Enter-
95. Andrew Langer, The Case for Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, REAL-
CLEARPOLITICS.COM (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/
11/28/the_case_for_ratification_of_the_law_of_the_sea_treaty_116272.html; see also
Brooke Jarvis, Deep-Sea Mining—Bonanza or Boondoggle? NOVA NEXT (June 25,
2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/earth/deep-sea-mining/; Rejecting the Law
of the Sea Treaty (LOST), National Space Society, 2 (2009), http://www.nss.org/legis-
lative/NSS-LoST-WhitePaper.pdf.
96. Brooke Jarvis, Deep-Sea Mining—Bonanza or Boondoggle? NOVANEXT (Jun.
25, 2013) available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/earth/deep-sea-mining/.
97. Rejecting the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST), National Space Society, 2 (Mar.
13, 2009), http://www.nss.org/legislative/NSS-LoST-WhitePaper.pdf.
98. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 137, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 473.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 137, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 458, 471.
104. Id. at 449.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 504.
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prise.107  The Enterprise will then make that technology available to
every nation who is party to the Treaty.108 The transfer of technology
can be conducted through licenses, but the requirement to transfer the
technology leaves little room for negotiation.109  The ISA is also able
to set the price of minerals that go to market.110
LOST has the goal of fair remuneration and cooperation in the ex-
traction of resources that belong to mankind.111  While this goal is no-
ble, the science and the markets were not mature enough to support
the end goals.  One of the problems that LOST creates is that it
removes incentive for companies to develop the processes and proce-
dures to profitably extract minerals from deep-sea beds.  The United
States’ reaction to the Treaty is likely based on these fears.  In 1974,
the United States disagreed with the arrangement set forth under the
initial LOST, and with seven other member states, created a different
treaty.112  Under this different treaty, the United States began to mine
an area outside of Hawaii considered international waters under UN
control.113  This project was ended due to the political pressures ap-
plied by the UN.114  Eventually, these conflicts were resolved when
the United States companies stopped mining.115  The United States
has a few areas under its exclusive jurisdiction (such as just off the
coast of Florida) but, the costs to mine the sea and develop the tech-
nology to do so efficiently has not been able to compete with inland
mines.116  As long as the ISA has the authority to keep and distribute
technologies and set the prices for commodities mined at levels on par
with surface mines, it is not likely that many advancements will occur
in the near future.  This is just one danger that following a treaty such
as LOST could create—stifled innovation.
LOST has many parallels with the Moon Treaty.  LOST follows suit
with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the OST by stating that the
minerals belong to mankind.117  The provision that grants this author-
ity in LOST was kept because the ISA believes the resources belong
to mankind, and large quantities or minerals were not being recov-
ered.118  Keeping with the treatment of LOST, the minerals found in
space are considered to belong to mankind.  It is also of note that the
107. Id.
108. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 137, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 504.
109. Id. at 530.
110. Id. at 451.
111. Id. at 398.
112. Bezpalko, supra note 89, at 871.




117. Id. at 882.
118. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 137, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 504.
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Moon Treaty was established in 1979 and LOST was established in
1982, resulting in similar language and provisions.119  Following
LOST, rights are granted in the minerals harvested, but only after a
license is granted to mine a site.  The actions taken under LOST show
that all minerals extracted create property rights within the party har-
vesting those minerals, even to non-signatory states.  Property rights
would be created in the minerals actually harvested, but not in the site
itself.
The development and acquisition of the technology to send a man
into space is so difficult that only three countries have conducted
manned space flights: The United States, Russia, and China.120  By
acceding to a Treaty similar to the Moon Treaty, and allowing a cen-
tral world governing body to control the technologies and minerals
derived from harvesting minerals in space, the only countries with a
heavy investment in this industry could lose their investments and
technology.  This brings up a glaring problem with the Moon Treaty: it
is valid international law.  While the United States, Russia, and China
have not ratified it, because several countries have ratified the Treaty,
it is still international law that can be brought up in international dis-
putes.  This is pressing because even though the United States is not a
signatory on LOST, the United States is classified as an observer state
and must pay dues to the ISA.121  One concern with the Moon Treaty
is that Russia and/or China can still sign on, giving significant weight
to the Treaty.122
b. Non-governmental Entities
Another major issue at play is the loophole left in the OST.  This
loophole could hypothetically allow a corporation or other non-gov-
ernmental entity to claim a property right in a celestial body.  This is
because the OST plainly states in Article II, “Outer Space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appro-
priation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.”123  So it appears that a non-governmental entity
could claim property rights in a celestial body, as long as the Treaty is
not interpreted to apply to that entity.
119. Rejecting the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST), National Space Society (Mar. 13,
2009), http://www.nss.org/legislative/NSS-LoST-WhitePaper.pdf at 1, 3.
120. Listner, supra note 47.
121. Marjorie Ann Browne, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Jan. 14, 2013, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33611.pdf at 5; see also Observer States To The Authority, INTERNATIONAL SEA-
BED Authority, http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/members/states/observers (last visited
July 31, 2014).
122. Listner, supra note 47.
123. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis added).
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There is a split in the courts and scholarly debate on this issue.124
The main argument for non-government entities is that they have not
signed the Treaty and are not held to it.125  The counter argument is
that these corporations are still subject to sovereign power, with that
sovereign required to take responsibility for the actions of that corpo-
ration.126  Traditionally, international law is binding only on the sover-
eign nations, because those laws govern only how the nations interact
with each other.127  The second circuit has held that corporations are
not subject to the same level of scrutiny as a sovereign nation under
customary international law.128  Rulings like this make enforcing in-
ternational laws such as the OST difficult against a non-governmental
entity.
The American courts have held that the government will recognize
private property rights for extraterrestrial property.  As explained ear-
lier in this Note, the theft of NASA’s lunar rocks shows that the gov-
ernment will grant property rights to materials harvested off Earth.  In
Nemitz, the courts declined the opportunity to examine the interac-
tion between the OST and the Moon Treaty.129  The Law Of the Sea
Treaty is similar to the Moon Treaty, and neither has been ratified by
the United States.  The United States has mostly ignored LOST and
the Moon Treaty.  The loophole in the OST is also still open because
non-governmental entities are traditionally only subject to the sover-
eign they are under.
IV. RIGHTS THAT CAN BE CREATED
The Outer Space Treaty is the main law governing interactions in
space.  The main reason to establish property rights in an asteroid
would be to exclude others from that same asteroid.  The right to ex-
clude others from property is the main right one would seek when
purchasing mining rights from an international body.  However, a cor-
poration may attempt to use the loophole to claim an asteroid, as it is
not making a national claim on it.
124. Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corporation as International Law Actor, VA. J. OF
INT’L L. DIGEST 79, 79–80 (2012).
125. Id. at 82.
126. Id. at 86.
127. Joel Slawotsky, Corporate liability for violating international law under The
Alien Tort Statute: The corporation through the lens of globalization and privatization,
INT’L REV. OF L. 1 (2013), http://www.qscience.com/doi/pdf/10.5339/irl.2013.6.
128. Mara Theophila, “Moral Monsters” Under the Bed: Holding Corporations Ac-
countable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2861 (2011); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010).
129. Nemitz v. United States, CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042 (D.
Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir.
2005).
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A. Ownership of Space Property
The OST contains a few ambiguities to explore.  One ambiguity is
what exactly a celestial body is.  Another ambiguity is whether na-
tional appropriation has anything to do with the creation of property
rights.
The OST and its progeny, including the Moon Treaty, all use the
term “celestial bodies.”130  Webster’s dictionary defines celestial body
as “an aggregation of matter in the universe that constitutes a unit (as
a planet, nebula) for astronomical study.”131  Dictionary.com defines a
celestial body as “Pertaining to the sky or visible heaven, or to the
universe beyond the earth’s atmosphere, as in celestial body.”132  The
Oxford Dictionary defines celestial as: “positioned in or relating to the
sky, or outer space as observed in astronomy ‘a celestial body.’”133
The Macmillan Dictionary simply states a celestial body is, “some-
thing in space, such as a star or planet.”134  While the term celestial
body leaves some ambiguity, common interpretation would include
any non-manmade objects ranging from a large nebula to a small as-
teroid.  This common usage, based on ambiguity, would not leave very
strong ground to support an argument that the OST does not apply to
an asteroid.
At first glance, the loophole in the OST would seem to work.135  A
corporation is not a government entity.  Corporations can be multina-
tional, and are commonly established to extract resources.  Multi-na-
tional corporations have traditionally not been subject to international
law.136  The Moon Treaty expressly closes this loophole in Article 11
by prohibiting a non-governmental organization from establishing
property rights.137  By expressly closing the loophole, the authors of
the Moon Treaty have attempted to correct the ambiguity left in the
OST.  Using the loophole, an argument could be made that a corpora-
tion could begin to harvest minerals from a sector of space filled with
asteroids.  The corporation would own those minerals, possibly the as-
teroids, but may have difficulty establishing ownership of the sector of
130. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16.
131. Celestial Body Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, availa-
ble at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/celestial%20body (last visited Mar.
23, 2014).
132. Celestial Body Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/celestialbody (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
133. Celestial Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oxforddic-
tionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/celestial (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
134. Celestial Object Definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillan
dictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/celestial-object (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
135. See supra Section IIIC2b, Earlier in this Note, the OST loophole was about the
possibility of corporations getting around international treaty because corporations
are not subject to international treaties.
136. Slawotsky, supra note 124, at 1.
137. Moon Treaty, supra note 42, at 31.
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space itself.  That corporation would be free to sell the resources ex-
tracted to any entity, not just their home country.
The counter to this argument is that the OST itself provides for the
closing of the loophole.  The OST closes the loophole in Article VI
and Article VII.138  Article VI provides that the jurisdiction that
launches the vehicle is responsible to enforce the Treaty.139  Article
VII provides that that vehicle launched is subject to the jurisdiction it
was launched under.140  This means that if a company such as SMC
launches a spacecraft in Arizona, the United States is responsible for
ensuring SMC abides by the Treaty, and that vehicle is considered an
American flagged vessel.  This argument is buttressed by the fact that
the UN’s Office for Outer Space Affairs website expressly denies that
a non-governmental entity can claim a celestial body because the
Treaty requires continuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party.141  The United States agreed to this when it created the Regis-
tration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Treaty, which was rati-
fied by the Senate, signed by the President, and entered into force in
1976.142  The Treaty, in Article I, section (a)(ii), defines that a launch-
ing state means “a state from whose territory or facility a space object
is launched.”143  This means that anything launched from American
soil is deemed to be flagged as an American vessel, subject to Ameri-
can jurisdiction, and any international treaties that the courts will
enforce.
Hypothetically, what happens if Space Mining Corp. (“SMC”) then
forms a subsidiary in Belize (a non-signatory, non-participating coun-
try)144 and launches a vessel to harvest an asteroid claiming that aster-
oid?  It would be up to international law and agreements to pressure
Belize and hold the nation responsible even though Belize did not sign
the charter.  The pressure could include trade embargos, or refusal to
purchase the mined materials.  Because SMC is an American corpora-
tion, international law would hold the United States responsible as
well.  As a result, international pressure could cause the government
of the United States to restrict SMC.  This is because the government
refused to enforce the Treaty.  The government of the United States
138. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 5.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AF-
FAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/FAQ/splawfaq.html (last visited July 31,
2014).
142. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
143. Id. at 5.
144. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space
(last visited July 31, 2014).
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might then be expected to take actions that go against SMC’s property
rights in the asteroid.
The OST does account for the loophole further into its text.  A cor-
poration exists due to government recognition by grants of rights and
privileges.145  While national appropriation yields images of a person
planting a flag, that nation is responsible for the actions of the corpo-
ration.  Even multinational corporations are recognized as belonging
to a parent state, as well as the nations they operate in.  It is because
of this that if SMC plants its flag on an asteroid, the home country still
has jurisdiction, and the property rights still have not been created.
B. Space Mining Methods and the OST
Article II of the OST prohibits the appropriation of a celestial body,
it does not speak of exploiting the resources of that body.  The three
main methods of mining asteroids are: bring the asteroid to earth, pro-
cess the asteroid on site, and bring the asteroid into stable orbit and
process it there.  If an asteroid is mined, this process is likely to create
property rights in those minerals due to the capture of those
resources.
The most dangerous way to harvest an asteroid would be to attach
some sort of engine to the asteroid or capture it in some large device
and redirect it back into the Earth’s orbit.146  While this conjures up
images of disaster movies, it has been hypothesized by scientists that
slowing the speed of the asteroid, having it land in the ocean, would
eliminate the catastrophic nature of the collision from an asteroid (be-
coming a meteorite) falling to Earth.147  Article IX of the OST prohib-
its this type of dangerous activity by prohibiting “adverse changes in
the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter. . . .”148  This means that bringing asteroids back to
earth would likely be a violation of the Treaty.  In a later agreement
called the Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused
145. Corporation Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at
WestlawNext. A corporation is defined in Black’s law dictionary as an entity having
authority under law to act as a single person. This right is gained by filing incorpora-
tion documents, and being recognized by the government as an entity from that point
on.
146. Asteroid Retrieval Feasibility Study, KECK INSTITUTE FOR SPACE STUDIES
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.kiss.caltech.edu/study/asteroid/asteroid_final_report.pdf;
see also Steven J. Ostro and Carl Sagan, Cosmic Collisions and the Longevity of Non-
Spacefaring Galactic Civilizations, JET PROPULSION LABORATORY, http://trs-new.jpl.
nasa.gov/dspace/bitstream/2014/19498/1/98-0908.pdf (last visited July 31, 2014).
147. See generally, William BC Crandall, To: The Augustine Committee, Enabling
Profitable Asteroid Mining, ABUNDANT PLANET 7(Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.nasa.gov/
pdf/383154main_53%20-%2020090803.7.toAugustineCommittee-2009-08-03.pdf at 7;
see also Stephen Harris, Your Questions Answered: Asteroid Mining, THEENGINEER.
CO.UK (Apr. 8, 2013) http://www.theengineer.co.uk/aerospace/in-depth/your-ques-
tions-answered-asteroid-mining/1015966.article.
148. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 6.
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by Space Objects, or the Liability Treaty, damages caused to any party
as a result of an object crashing to Earth are the responsibility of the
nation that flagged the ship.149  Thus, it is not likely any country would
approve this method for harvesting an asteroid.
The next way to capture an asteroid would be to land a vehicle on it
that could adjust the trajectory of the asteroid into a stable orbit near
a processing facility.150  This method still has the risk of collision with
other objects, but is much safer than crashing the asteroid into the
Earth.  Using this method could create property rights because of the
capture or occupation of the asteroid.
If NASA brings the asteroid into stable orbit, according to Article
II of the OST, no property rights could be enforced.151  This is because
the party claiming the asteroid would be NASA, not a corporation.
NASA’s claim would be a national claim of sovereignty, or the same
exclusive use of the asteroid expressly prohibited in Article II.  Ex-
tracting and claiming the resources is plausible, but not while the as-
teroid is a celestial body.  If SMC brought the asteroid into stable
orbit, the OST still applies.  SMC would not have property rights in
the asteroid until processing.  The OST mission for the peaceful explo-
ration of space and the generation of property rights through capture
will likely get heavy weight, as taking a captured asteroid from an-
other party does not lead to peace.  The method of stable orbit leaves
potential problems that are solvable by treating only captured aster-
oids as claimed.  If technology makes this method feasible, the OST
may need amending to reduce potential conflict if two parties are at-
tempting to capture the same asteroid.
The last method commonly discussed is the on-site harvesting of the
minerals in the asteroid.152  The idea is to land some form of solar-
powered unit to harvest the resources, and then return these resources
back to a station or Earth.153  This method would be clear as to who
should own the property rights, as the minerals would have been fully
captured.  As far as the OST is concerned, this is merely harvesting
resources, and not staking a claim on a celestial body.  Where this
becomes troublesome is if two competing factions are attempting to
get the same resources from the same asteroid.  Currently, the re-
sources would likely go to whoever extracts them.
The OST and its progeny consistently talk about the spirit of coop-
eration.  Grounds against cooperation start to arise if multiple parties
149. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
150. Harris, supra note 147(b); See also Asteroid Retrieval Feasibility Study, KECK
INSTITUTE FOR SPACE STUDIES (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.kiss.caltech.edu/study/as-
teroid/asteroid_final_report.pdf.
151. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 5.
152. US Company Aims to ‘Harvest’ Asteroids, PHYS.ORG (Jan. 22, 2013), http://
phys.org/news/2013-01-company-aims-harvest-asteroids.html.
153. Id.
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are attempting to collect the same asteroid, commonly known as the
free rider problem.154  While the costs would be astronomical, it is
likely that agreements and contracts will be created to reduce the risk.
As asteroid mining becomes cheaper and more efficient, registering a
launch to a specific asteroid with the UN (because a nation cannot
have sovereignty) may be a simple enough solution to claim those
rights.  Then again, this may not be necessary.  In Pierson v. Post, Post
was still pursuing the fox when Pierson ended the chase.155  Pierson
gained his rights by mortally wounding the fox–Post did not first regis-
ter that he would be hunting the fox.  This method of establishing
property rights by mortally wounding the wild animal still serves
hunters.
United States law gives the basis for the process of harvesting the
minerals, and will establish property rights in those minerals.  The
Apollo missions set the precedent when the United States collected
and brought back lunar samples to Earth.  Where this gets compli-
cated is that the OST was in effect as the missions in the Apollo pro-
gram were ending.156  There is an argument to be made that there is a
property right created in the harvested material because the OST al-
lows for the collection and use of materials in Article VIII.157  Article
VIII provides that “Ownership of objects launched into outer space,
including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of
their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space
or on a celestial body or by their return to earth.”158  This article ap-
pears to govern the creation of facilities when using launched compo-
nents combined with harvested components.  It could be argued to
include harvesting and using of metals to build facilities or the acquisi-
tion and use of hydrogen to refuel rockets, allowing the nation to flag
the use of the minerals as the nation’s own property; comingling the
new materials with those launched from Earth.  This would raise the
question of what percentage of terrestrial matter is required for own-
ership.  A low percentage would probably be valid; this is because the
materials would have to be processed and incorporated, modifying the
minerals into pieces of the facility, still being flagged by the govern-
ment building the structure.
154. Bezpalko, supra note 89, at 883.
155. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 1805 WL 781, 1805 N.Y. Lexis 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805).
156. The last Apollo mission to reach the moon was launched Dec. 7, 1972, and the
OST came into effect in 1967. Apollo 17, NASA.gov (April 7, 2011), http://www.
nasa.gov/mission_pages/apollo/missions/apollo17.html#.UwFpNfldVzU; U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
157. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 5.
158. Id.
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The OST was written with the intent to keep a nation from planting
a flag on the moon and claiming it.  Maintaining the provisions in the
OST is still possible, even when parties begin to harvest resources
from those celestial bodies.  The only adjustment that may be needed
is over who would “own” the asteroid if multiple parties were compet-
ing for ownership.  The process of capture is a likely source to grant
property rights in the resources collected, just not to a private com-
pany claiming a sector of the asteroid belt.
C. Private Ventures and Speculation
The only country pushing for privatization of the space industry is
the United States.  The OST applied in its current form would hold
the United States responsible for the actions undertaken by the priva-
tized space companies because of Article VI and VII of the OST.
Many Americans have purchased a “Lunar Deed” from a person who
claimed the moon, (and several other planets and their moons), citing
Article II as the authority to take ownership.
If a person were to claim an asteroid merely by registering it with an
agency (such as the Archimedes institute), the courts would likely
agree with the ruling in Nemitz and hold that no rights were cre-
ated.159  Another example would be Dennis Hope who sells “Lunar
Deeds.”160  Mr. Hope stated that he claimed ownership of the moon
by sending a letter to the UN stating his claim and demanding a re-
sponse to state if that claim was invalid.161  He stated that he did this
because he saw the loophole in the OST and decided that if a govern-
ment could not own the moon, then he should be able to.162  He has
been selling plots of land on the moon since 1995, and believes that
most of his customers believe these are actual rights because 42% of
his sales are to trusts.163  While no one has legally challenged these
deeds, because of the time and notoriety involved, it could be argued
that the UN acquiesced to Mr. Hope.  On the other hand, Mr. Hope
knows that his claim has severe legitimacy issues because he recently
established the “Galactic Government” (ratified by over 100,000 of
the moon’s “landowners”) and is seeking for it to be recognized as a
nation.164  Ironically, by creating a government, the “Galactic Govern-
ment” now conflicts with the OST, prohibiting a national govern-
ment’s claim to appropriation.
159. Nemitz v. United States, CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042 (D.
Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126 Fed. App’x 343 (9th Cir.
2005).
160. Rachel Hardwick, Denis M. Hope has Owned the Moon Since 1980 Because He
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Investors, who would fund the private venture into space mining,
would likely want some form of return in the minerals harvested.
These initial space mining ventures do not need to claim the asteroids
they are attempting to harvest because of the very large barriers to
entry.  As the technology becomes more readily available, these pio-
neering companies may have established regions where they exclu-
sively mine asteroids.  This is where the major challenge to the OST
and property rights would come into play.  The Liability Convention
Article III provides that the party that damages another is responsi-
ble.165  So if SMC claimed a sector of asteroids, the OST would not
protect it.  If SMC attempted to police this area itself, it would be
liable for any damage done.  The home nation would also be responsi-
ble because of articles VI and VII of the OST, which requires the
government to flag the vessels and requires enforcement of the
OST.166
The privatization of space as an industry, for now, seems to be hap-
pening only in the United States.167  Russia revitalized its bankrupt
space program by pioneering space tourism.  Dennis Tito was Russia’s
first commercial space tourist, purchasing a flight to the international
space station for $20 million on April 28, 2001.168  Russia is also ferry-
ing American astronauts to and from the International Space Station
since the end of NASA’s shuttle program in 2011.169  Russia would
have started a market for private space ventures if the loophole was
considered a realistic possibility.  After the fall of the Soviet Union,
the Russian Space Agency went bankrupt.  One could speculate that if
the Russian government believed this loophole was a possibility, it
would have sold their usable Soyuz capsules to a nongovernment en-
tity.  China has recently landed an unmanned drone on the moon.170
China is likely using that drone to scout for good resource collection
sites that are also near the lunar poles, where water has been discov-
ered.171  If China were to grant its space technologies and resources to
a fledgling company (such as SpaceX, which was given a multimillion-
165. Liability Convention, supra note 149, at 5.
166. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at 5.
167. Dominic Basulto, Funding Manned Space Exploration is Not Rocket Science,
BIGTHINK.COM (Apr. 25, 2011, 9:27 PM), http://bigthink.com/endless-innovation/
funding-manned-space-exploration-is-not-rocket-science.
168. Mike Wall, First Space Tourist: How a U.S. Millionaire Bought a Ticket to Or-
bit, SPACE.COM (Apr. 27, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.space.com/11492-space-tourism-
pioneer-dennis-tito.html.
169. Irene Klotz, NASA Wants “Space Taxis” To Bring Astronauts To The Interna-
tional Space Station, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM  (Nov. 19, 2013, 9:52 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/nasa-iss-space-taxis-2013-11.
170. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Will China Restart the Space Race?, USATODAY.COM
(Dec. 16, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/16/china-
moon-astronaut-nasa-column/4031105/.
171. Jennifer Ouellette, This Moon was Made for Farming (Helium-3), DISCOVER-
YNEWS.COM (Feb. 21, 2011, 10:47 PM), http://news.discovery.com/space/this-moon-
was-made-for-mining.htm.
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dollar startup grant by the United States government),172 it could be-
gin to test the loophole by claiming that site.  At this point, it would be
unnecessary for China to create such a nongovernmental entity.  The
OST allows for countries to build structures.  Conflict will only begin
once one party attempts to exclude another by claiming property
rights.  Should this conflict happen, parties to the Treaty would have
to pressure the country not following the Treaty into compliance.
As the OST is applied to hypothetical and real situations, it still
holds up and allows for the construction of colonies and the extraction
of resources.  The loophole itself is, at a minimum governed under
Sections VI and VII of the OST, holding the launching nation respon-
sible.  Another extreme possibility to avoid the OST could be re-
nouncing citizenship of the Earth.  Renouncing citizenship would then
make any treaty inapplicable to that person, resulting in no governing
authority over that person.  This is a flawed position because the en-
forcement of the OST could be based on trade embargos against that
non-Earth entity.
V. CONCLUSION
The answer to the question of, “Can I own an asteroid?” is no.  Cre-
ation of an international regime to govern the property rights of ob-
jects in space would make ownership possible, but most nations are
not ready to give the UN control.  It is possible to gain property rights
in the resources harvested from that asteroid.  The OST has reached
wide acceptance, and most nations are a part of it.  This Treaty can
still govern any interaction in space.  Any change in the status quo
would stifle the development of the industry. This would lead to a
situation like in LOST, where the result was slowing the creation of an
infant industry.  The ISA stalled the development of sea floor mining
once it came into effect.  Most countries in the world have not signed
the Moon Treaty.  A party owns resources collected from space and
returned to Earth, with property rights in those resources.  As space
exploration matures, so will new technologies and new ways to gener-
ate revenue.  Space mining is still in its infancy, and property rights
will emerge once theoretical problems become real problems.
172. Loren Thompson, What NASA Risks By Betting On Elon Musk’s SpaceX,
FORBES.COM (May 23, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/05/
23/what-nasa-risks-by-betting-on-elon-musks-spacex/.
